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I. Introduction
Capital structure decisions are enigmatic. There is a surprising lack of consensus even
about the basic empirical facts regarding capital structure decisions. This led Myers
(1984) to coin the phrase “the capital structure puzzle” and raised a number of
unanswered questions. While much research has been conducted since 1984, many of
Myers’ questions remain unresolved. In an influential and controversial paper, Welch
(2004) provides US evidence on Myers questions. For instance, Welch (2004) finds that
firms are basically inert and their capital structure changes are mainly caused by their
stock returns. Moreover, he documents that firms do not issue debt or equity to counter
the effect of stock returns on their capital structure. Welch also shows that after
controlling for stock return effects, many previously used proxies play a minor role in
explaining capital structure dynamics. But how general is this so-called inertia theory?
Are the Welch results general or are they unique to a US institutional setting? Our main
objective in this paper is to examine whether stock returns are an important factor in
firms capital structure choices in a different market to the US, namely Oman.
There are several institutional factors that differentiate the US from Oman. First,
in Oman banks play a pivotal role in financing firms listed on the Muscat Securities
Market (MSM), whereas US firms rely more on the public debt market. Second, due to
the simplicity of the tax system, Oman provides an “interesting laboratory” to test
financial theories. In Oman there are neither personal income taxes nor taxes on
investment income such as dividends and capital gains. Specifically firms are taxed at a
flat rate of 12% and individuals are not taxed at all.
Our results show that Omani firms have high leverage ratios and the main source of
debt is short-term bank financing. The limited bond market leaves room for banks to
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play an important role in financing Omani firms. Banks mainly provide short-term loans
and this explains the high reliance of Omani firms on short-term borrowing.
We also find robust evidence that stock price changes have a strong and primary
effect on observed market-based debt ratios. Firms’ capital structures seem to move in
line with that mechanistically induced by their stock returns. We also find that firms
show some tendency to revert to their previous debt ratios. However, the impact of stock
returns dominates the effects of readjustment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and
presents the measures that we construct to estimate the impact of stock returns on capital
structure dynamics. Section III develops the regression specification, presents and
examines the estimation results. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Data and Methodology
A. Data
The data for this study are taken from “Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed
Companies” published by the MSM. The MSM collects annual financial statements and
stock price data for all firms listed on MSM. The MSM maintains a website that
provides information and financial data related to the performance of listed firms. Each
year MSM publishes a book “Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed Companies” which
contains accounting information from financial statements as well as stock return and
ownership structure data. We complement the data from the MSM Guide with the MSM
index which we obtain from the MSM.
The data set comprise all publicly traded firms listed on the MSM in the four
industry sectors that comprise the MSM namely, financial and banking sector, service
sector, industry sector, and insurance sector. These sectors contain firms from various
industries including hotels, poultry, leasing, fisheries, oil, agriculture, energy, power,
3

aviation, banks, investment firms, and manufacturing firms. The data are time series
cross-sectional variables which are collected over the entire life of the MSM from 1989
to 2003.
Any observations with missing data for the book value of debt, and/or market value
of equity are deleted because these variables are required to calculate our dependent and
independent variables. Because our regression specification includes lagged variables,
we also exclude any firm with fewer than two consecutive years of data. The number of
firms included in the study changes from one year to another, with a range from 60 to
142. The final data set is an unbalanced panel containing 1,263 firm-year observations.
B. Empirical Model
Our research question is whether variation in market leverage ratio is caused primarily
by stock returns or deliberate managerial choices to adjust to their past target debt ratios.
The basic empirical model is a time series cross sectional regression of firms’ debt ratios
against the lagged market leverage ratio and the stock return induced changes in market
value of equity. This estimating equation extends the model used by Welch (2004) to
Oman. As with previous studies, the dependent variable in our regressions is market
leverage ratio or as Welch calls it the Actual Debt Ratio (ADRt). We define accounting
measures in accordance with Welch (2004). Specifically, ADR is defined as the ratio of
book value of debt (D) scaled by the book value of debt and the market value of equity
(E):

ADRt 

Dt
Dt  Et

(1)
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where Dt is the sum of current liabilities and long-term liabilities at time t and Et is the
market value of equity at time t (computed as the number of outstanding shares
multiplied by the market price). As in Welch (2004), our explanatory variables are the
lagged ADR and the IDRt,t+k. IDRt,t+k is the implied debt ratio that results if the firm
does not adjust its leverage, i.e., it neither issues nor retires debt or equity. It is
constructed to measure the extent to which market leverage ratios are expected to
change in response to stock returns. By construction, IDR moves mechanistically with
stock returns, and not with managerial capital structure decisions. Consistent with
Welch (2004) notation, the IDR is:

IDRt ,t  k 

Dt
Et .(1  xt ,t  k )  Dt

(2)

where Dt and Et are as defined above, xt,t+k is the stock return from t to t+k net of any
dividend, t is a random error, and k is the horizon measured in years.
Hence, the basic regression equation in Welch (2004) is:
ADRt k   0  1  ADRt   2  IDRt ,t k  t

(3)

As in Welch (2004), perfect readjustment implies that 1  1,  2  0 , while perfect
inertia suggests 1  0,  2  1 . As robustness checks, we also perform the analysis
separately on short-term debt, long-term debt, and bank debt.
Under the hypothesis of optimizing behavior and zero adjustment costs, the
readjustment hypothesis reflects a target that managers wish to achieve each period. On
the other hand, the inertia (non-readjustment) hypothesis implies that any change in
leverage between t and t+k is due to the stock return over the period. We estimate
equation (3) twice, with and without an intercept. When we include the intercept  0 , it
5

captures a constant target debt ratio. If firms manage their capital structure to maximize
the advantage of debt for the shareholders, then the coefficient on ADR should be unity.
On the other hand, if debt ratios are driven mechanistically by stock returns, then the
coefficient on IDR should be unity.
Since our focus is on the dynamics of a firm’s capital structure choice, we express
the capital structure adjustment in equation (2) as follows. Leverage changes with new
debt issues, debt retirements, coupon payments, and debt value changes. As a result,
corporate debt can be expressed as:
Dt  k  Dt  TDNI t ,t  k

(4)

where TDNI stands for total debt net issuing activity. As in Welch (2004), we define
TDNI as the difference in total debt value between t+k and t. Similarly, corporate equity
changes with stock returns (net of dividends), and new equity issues net of equity
repurchases. Consequently, corporate equity can be expressed as:
Et k  Et .(1  xt ,t k )  ENI t ,t k

(5)

where ENI reflects a firm’s net equity issuing and stock repurchasing activity. ENI is
then defined as the difference in total equity value between t+k and t without return and
dividend effects. Under this definition, actual debt ratios can be expressed as:
ADRt ,t  k 

Dt  TDNI t ,t  k
Dt  k

Dt  k  Et  k Dt  TDNI t ,t  k  Et .(1  xt ,t  k )  ENI t ,t  k

(6)

C. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of basic variables after modifications to address
outliers as follows. We trim the upper and lower two percentile of each variable’s
distribution in the normalized series. Using these criteria, we identify 1,212 firm-year
6

observations for the one-year regression and 612 for the 5-year regressions, covering
corporate financing behaviour from 1989 to 2003.
On average, Omani companies have a total accounting assets of RO 40 million, with
around 47% of the assets being short-term.1 These assets are employed to earn an
average RO 8.1 million in revenue. The mean market value of sample firms is about
1.33 times accounting assets. However, the median market value is much smaller than
the book value of assets. Similarly, the median market value is considerably smaller
than the mean market value. The actual debt ratio is around 48%, financed mostly
through bank loans.2 Short-term debt exceeds long-term debt ratio during the period
under investigation. The standard deviation for short-term debt ratio similarly exceeds
that for long-term debt.
The summary statistics of Table 1 show the importance of the dynamic components
of debt ratios. During the period of study, the average sample firm achieves stock return
of around 1.5% and pay out 0.9% in dividends. This is significantly lower than the 8.8%
return reported in Welch (2004) for US firms. A difference also exists for the stock price
induced capitalization change which is about 0.1% in Oman compared to 7.0% in the
US. However, a different pattern exists for issuing activity in Oman where Omani firms
seem to issue more debt and equity than firms in the US. On average, Omani firms issue
approximately 6.6% (3.7% for the US) in debt and 6.3% (2.4% for the US) in equity.
This suggests that Omani firms are quite active issuers. As a result, issuing activity may

1

We did not inflation-adjust book values because the rate of inflation in Oman during the sample period is
low.
2
This is much higher than the 29.8% reported by Welch (2004) for the US.
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potentially be large enough to counteract a substantial part of stock return influence on
capital structure choice.3
Insert Table 1 here
To examine whether stock returns can explain debt ratio dynamics, we follow Welch’s
approach. We first sort all firms by calendar year. Then we sort by sales decile to control
for size. Then we allocate firms into 10 bins on the basis of their net stock return
performance where we keep a roughly equal number of firms in each decile. The header
rows in Table 2 report the median net stock returns for each decile. The first three rows
report actual capital structure relevance of debt ratio dynamics. The “ending ADR” rows
suggest that there is a large spread of resulting debt ratios across firms having recently
experienced different rates of return. Over a one year horizon, the worst stock
performers end up with an actual debt ratio of 60.4% whereas firms with the best stock
performance end up with an actual debt ratio of 43%. Over five years, firms that have
underperformed the MSM by 19% end up with an actual debt ratio of 58.7%, while
firms that have outperformed the MSM by 75% end up with an actual debt ratio of
46.1%.
Insert Table2 here
The “starting ADR” rows demonstrate that over one year the worst stock performers
have lower starting debt ratios than the best stock performers. A similar pattern is
exhibited over the 5-year horizon. This suggests that there is a correlation between debt
ratios and stock performance.

3

We found that firms did try to offset the mechanistic effect of stock return surprises but did so slowly.
Results are not reported but available on request.
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The “implied IDR” rows show the impact of stock returns on starting debt ratios. Over
one year, firms that have underperformed the MSM end up with higher implied debt
ratio relative to firms that have outperformed the stock market. However, the opposite
pattern appears in the 5-year horizon. This means that over one year firms with poor
stock performance have high implied debt ratios which are then reversed in the 5-year
horizon. Data rows four to eight present corporate debt issue and dividend activity,
while the ninth row reports equity growth, all scaled by firm size. The results indicate
that the majority of firms are quite active with respect to their capital structures. Over
one year, firms respond to poor stock performance with more equity issuing activity and
to good performance with more debt issuing activity.4 This is opposite to what Welch
reports for the US. However, the relationship is not clear over the 5-year horizon in
terms of debt issuing. Over five years, firms issue less equity regardless of stock return
performance. The seventh row shows a negative relationship between stock performance
and “activist equity expansion” over an annual horizon. This relationship disappears
over the 5-year horizon where equity expansion contracts regardless of stock returns.
The eighth row investigates whether firms intentionally expand or contract in response
to stock return performance. Over both annual and 5-year horizons, firms appear to
contract regardless of stock return performance. However, this contraction is larger for
firms with good stock performance compared to firms with poor performance over a
five year period. As an exception, the best decile of stock price performers do engage in
some active expansion, approximately, 45.8% of their firm value. This suggests that
firms do take countermeasures to offset the impact of stock return surprises. The last

4

This implies that firms in our sample do try to counteract the mechanical influence of stock returns.
However, the relationship is not strong. See also footnote (3).
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row in Table 2 shows a positive association between induced equity growth and stock
performance over both annual and 5-year horizon. For instance, firms with good stock
performance have more stock return induced equity growth compared to firms with poor
stock performance.
In summary, most MSM firms are quite active in their capital structure decisions.
Firms make quite frequent approaches to the public and private financial markets. Our
results show that firm’s stock returns induce some corporate issuing activity and it
seems that managers use issuing activity to counteract some of the mechanistic effect of
stock returns. Stock return induced equity growth moves in tandem with stock return
performance.
III. Estimation Results
Table 3 presents the empirical results computed using the basic regression equation (3).
To avoid overstating significance levels by pooling the data over time, we employ the
Fama and MacBeth (F-M) (1973) regression approach. Under this methodology, we first
run yearly cross sectional regressions. We then report the mean coefficient estimates
across time and use the time series standard deviation of the slopes in the year-by-year
regressions to compute standard errors. The main advantage of this approach is that it
circumvents the problems caused by heteroscedasticity and correlation of residuals
across firms (Lipson and Mortal (2008)). Fama and French (2002, p. 3) describe F-M as
“a simple way to obtain robust standard errors that capture whatever contributes to the
precision of the average slopes”. Another advantage of this approach is that it enables us
to have a large number of data points. This increases the precision of the slopes and
reduces their year-by-year volatility (Fama and French (1998)). However, as Fama and
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French (1998) note, this approach suffers from the problem that the sample
autocorrelation of the slopes is imprecise. They account for the autocorrelation of the
regression slopes by requiring a t-statistic of around three to infer reliability. In this
study, we closely follow this approach. We are also concerned that the regressions may
suffer from extreme observations. We winsorize the distributions at the 2nd and 98th
percentile for variables with extreme values, consistent with Welch (2004).
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results without a constant, and thus does not allow for
a constant target debt ratio. For the one year horizon, all panels show that the IDR t,t+k
better explains the predicted ADRt+k than does the lagged ADRt. The coefficients on
IDRt,t+k are in the range of 50% to 70%, whereas the range for ADRt is 26% to 41%.
This suggests that a large fraction of the time variation in the level of leverage stems
from movements in the stock returns. Over one year, an average firm allows its debt
ratio to drift by around 62% with stock returns. The average firm show some tendency
to move back towards its past debt ratio. Still, the influence of stock returns through
IDR dominates the effects of readjustments. Over all horizons, the coefficient on ADR
is about half the size of the IDR coefficient, suggesting that the impact of stock returns
is twice as large as the effects of readjustments. Now turning to the diagnostics of the
regression estimates, the adjusted R2 is strong in all cases. However, it generally exhibits
an inverse relation with the model horizon. The adjusted R2 is 93% for the 1-year
regression, while it is 88%, 85.5%, 82% and 84% for the two years, three years, four
years, and five years, respectively.
Insert Table 3 here
Nevertheless, if we compare our results with those of Welch we see that the impact
of stock returns in Oman is much less than that for the US. In a similar vein, Omani
11

firms are more inclined to adjust their capital structure to their old debt ratios relative to
firms in the US.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (3) including an intercept.
This panel demonstrates similar results to the results obtained in Panel A. The
coefficients on ADR suggest that firms have some tendency to revert to their old debt
ratios, though the inclusion of the constant reduces the estimated ADR coefficients
relative to Panel A. However, the coefficients on IDR still exert considerably more
influence on firms’ debt ratios than does ADR. Additionally, the intercepts are relatively
similar in magnitude and exhibit a positive association with the model horizon. This
implies that firms show marginal increases in debt ratios over the sample period. In
summary, all panels show that the IDRt,t+k lines up better with the predicted ADRt+k than
does the lagged ADRt. This suggests that a large fraction of the time variation in the
level of leverage stems from movements in the stock returns, as opposed to active
financial management. This does not mean that firms do not try to rebalance. In fact,
firms in our sample show some tendency to return to their old debt ratios, and this
tendency is more pronounced for Oman that it is for US firms. However, the impact of
stock returns dominates the effects of adjustments.
IV. Conclusion
We examine whether capital structure changes are driven by stock price movements for
Omani companies listed on MSM. Using data for Oman provides several advantages.
First, the data avoid the complexity of tax systems faced by previous studies, and as a
result may help us to provide clearer results on the importance of debt in financing firms
in a personal tax free environment. Second, Oman has unique financing arrangements
12

that are characterized by high leverage and high reliance on bank debt, which should
alleviates the agency problems by forcing managers to pay out the firm’s free cash flow.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find strong evidence that equity price
shocks have a primary effect on corporate capital structure dynamics. Second, the
average firm in our sample shows some tendency to rebalance their capital structure in
response to shocks in the market value of equity. However, stock returns exert more
influence on the market leverage ratio compared to the effects of rebalancing.
There are some important differences between the findings of this study and Welch
(2004). First, the impact of stock returns is less pronounced compared to the US.
Second, Omani firms have a higher inclination to readjust their capital structure. Third,
in contrast to Welch, we find short-term debt issuing activity is the most capital
structure relevant corporate activity. Our conclusion is that stock price effects are more
important in explaining leverage ratios than several factors previously identified in the
capital structure literature.
In sum, the empirical results highlight the distinctive features of the Omani business
environment and could therefore be of particular value for policy makers. For example,
the apparent narrow choice over sources of finance - primary bank loans - for corporate
investment should be of interest to policy makers as expansion of these sources may
contribute to economic growth. Second, the limited size of bond market in Oman
constrains firms’ choices over sources of financing, forcing them to take loans from
banks. The development of a market for corporate bonds would give firms more room in
choosing sources of financing. Thus polices that are concerned with the development of
the bond market may need to be considered if firms are to be encouraged to optimize
their capital structure.
13
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics

Abbreviation
ADRt
IDRt,t+k
ADRCL
ADRLTL
ADR BL
CA
LTA
Et +Dt
Rev

Description
Actual Debt Ratio
Implied Debt Ratio
Actual Debt Ratio; Current Liabilities Only
Actual Debt Ratio: Long-term Liabilities Only
Actual Debt Ratio: Bank Loan Only
Amount of Current Assets in (million Omani Rial5)
Amount of Long-term Assets in (million Omani Rial)
Market values in (million Omani Rial)
Revenue in (million Omani Rial)
Normalized by Market Value and Winsorized

Mean
48.1
47.0
29.5
18.6
36.5
19.20
21.33
53.91
8.11

1-Year
Median
49.0
48.0
24.6
13.4
20.9
2.32
2.49
8.32
2.41

TDNIt,t+k
ENIt,t+k
TDNIt,t+k +ENIt,t+k
Divt,t+k = (rt,t+k – xt,t+k ).Et
ENIt,t+k –Divt,t+k
TDNIt,t+k +ENIt,t+k –Divt,t+k
rt,t+k . Et
Xt,t+k..Et

Net Debt Issuing
Net Equity Issuing w/o Dividends
Debt and Equity Issuing
Dividends
Activist Equity Expansion
Activist Total Expansion
Total Return in Omani Rial
Induced Equity Growth

6.6
6.3
14.2
0.9
5.0
12.7
1.5
0.1

3.0
0.0
4.6
0.0
0.0
3.5
0.0
0.01

Std.
Dev.
26.3
26.8
21.7
18.9
43.0
144.10
97.05
387.63
20.33

16.0
15.2
32.4
1.7
15.8
33.1
13.5
12.7

Mean

5-Year
Median

Std.
Dev.

42.2

39.7

24.8

5.3
-10.6
-9.7
2.2
-13.0
-12.2
2.0
4.4

12.3
4.5
27.5
0.8
3.3
24.8
1.6
2.8

60.8
88.5
140.8
4.0
90.4
143.1
13.9
14.2

The sample consists of all publicly listed firms at the MSM from 1989 to 2003. Firm years with missing data on book value of debt or market value of equity are
excluded. There are 1,212 firm-year observations in the one-year panel and 612 firm-year observations in the five-year panel. Firms are normalized by firm value
(book value of debt plus market value of equity) and then winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. Variables are expressed in percentages unless otherwise indicated.

5

Omani Rial is worth around $2.6.
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TABLE 2. Corporate activity, equity growth, and capital structure, classified by stock returns (year-adjusted and sales adjusted)
Panel A: Sort by Calendar Year, Sales, One Year Net Stock Returns.
Sort Criterion, Net Return (t, t+1)
-63
-30
-16
-6
-1
0
7
21
45
198
Ending ADRt+1
60.4
50.2
48.1
49.7
49.7
55.4
45.0
50.4
42.1
43.0
Starting ADRt
48.5
43.5
42.9
48.2
49.0
53.2
42.9
50.6
44.8
57.1
Return Induced IDRt,t+1
67.2
50.2
46.0
49.5
48.8
52.4
41.7
47.3
38.4
38.6
Net Debt Issuing, TDNI t,t+1
-80.3
-0.4
2.1
0.0
-5.2
3.6
-1.2
0.5
6.2
3.4
Net Equity Issuing, ENI t,t+1
3.6
2.2
-1.9
-3.2
0.2
-0.2
23.3
-0.7
0.3
-17.6
Dividends, DIV t,t+1
1.0
1.4
3.9
1.3
1.1
1.8
3.6
2.8
4.1
2.3
Activist Equity Expansion (ENI-DIV)
2.6
0.9
-5.8
-4.5
-0.9
-2.0
-26.9
-3.5
-3.8
-19.9
Activist Expansion (TDNI+ENI-DIV)
-77.7
0.5
-3.7
-4.5
-6.1
1.7
-28.1
-3.0
2.4
-16.5
Induced Equity Growth, X t,t+1
-80.1
-20.1
-9.8
-3.6
-0.3
0.1
4.9
8.7
17.7
44.9
Panel B: Sort by Calendar Year, Sales, 5-Year Net Stock Returns.
Sort Criterion, Net Return (t, t+5)
-19
-9
-3
0
5
10
15
23
36
75
Ending ADRt+5
58.7
53.4
46.9
51.3
48.6
45.6
45.7
46.7
50.9
46.1
Starting ADRt
35.6
32.5
36.2
43.9
41.3
46.7
42.9
45.8
57.6
58.4
Return Induced IDRt,t+5
39.9
34.1
36.8
43.8
40.4
44.9
40.2
42.3
52.0
48.2
Net Debt Issuing, TDNI t,t+5
-23.0
5.3
9.7
7.7
6.0
-1.2
11.6
-17.0
-42.4
-2.9
Net Equity Issuing, ENI t,t+5
-98.6
-70.7
-43.8 -18.4
-5.7
9.5
0.4
-71.2
-145.8
52.4
Dividends, DIV t,t+5
5.0
2.5
2.4
3.7
2.3
2.7
2.3
1.7
10.9
3.8
Activist Equity Expansion (ENI-DIV)
-103.6
-73.2
-46.2 -22.1
-8.0
6.8
-1.9
-72.9
-156.7
48.6
Activist Expansion (TDNI+ENI-DIV)
-126.6
-67.8
-36.5 -14.5
-2.0
5.6
9.8
-89.9
-199.1
45.8
Induced Equity Growth, X t,t+5
-32.6
-9.9
-3.4
0.4
2.7
4.5
6.6
14.9
24.5
39.6
All variables are medians and are expressed in percentages. Firms are sorted first by year, then by sales decile, and then allocated to deciles based on their stock return
rank (within each group of 10 firms). In each panel, the 4th rows through the 9th rows are normalized by firm size. Other rows are not normalized. In panel A, there are
between 100 and 120 observations per decile; in panel B, between 50 and 65.
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TABLE 3. Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting ADRt+k with ADRt and IDRt,t+k
Panel A: Without Intercept
Horizon k
con.
ADRt
IDRt,t+k
s.e.c
s.e.ADR
1 Year F-M
26.3
62.4
3.91
2 Year F-M
37.9
61.5
5.66
3 Year F-M
34.7
62.4
6.74
4 Year F-M
40.9
50.7
7.73
5 Year F-M
28.5
69.3
4.98
Panel B: With Intercept
Horizon k
ADRt
IDRt,t+k
s.e.ADR
1 Year F-M
9.2
15.0
68.3
0.84
3.86
2 Year F-M
15.3
18.8
53.6
1.18
5.44
3 Year F-M
18.9
19.1
46.4
1.40
6.30
4 Year F-M
24.0
16.4
41.2
1.61
7.02
5 Year F-M
21.1
13.4
48.3
1.77
4.70

s.e.IDR
3.90
5.67
6.69
7.70
4.86
s.e.IDR
3.76
5.26
6.13
6.78
4.66

Adjusted R2 (%)
93.0
88.0
85.5
82.0
84.0
Adjusted R2 (%)
71.7
53.3
44.7
35.3
37.5

N
1212
1049
896
750
612

T
14
13
12
11
10

N
1212
1049
896
750
612

T
14
13
12
11
10

The sample comprises all publicly listed firms at the MSM between 1989-2003. The table presents the results of annual cross-sectional regressions explaining firms’ debt ratios
(debt dividend by debt plus market value of equity) with the implied debt ratio IDR (where the lagged market value of equity is grossed up by the raw stock return over the period
k) and the firms own lagged debt ratio ADRt. The cross-sectional regression equation is: ADRt  k  [ 0 ] 1  ADRt   2  IDRt ,t  k  t  k . A coefficient of 100% on
ADRt indicates perfect readjustment. On the other hand, a coefficient of 100% on IDRt,t+k indicates perfect lack of readjustment. Fama and MacBeth report means (across years)
of the regression intercepts and slopes. The adjusted R2’s are time-series averages of cross-sectional estimates. N is the number of firm year observations and T is the number of
cross-sectional regressions.
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